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A central diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is the qualitative
impairment in reciprocal social interaction and a prominent hypotheses that tried to
explain this impairment is the Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit hypotheses. On a behavioral
level the critical test for having a ToM, the understanding of false beliefs (FB), is often used
for testing ToM abilities in individuals with ASD. Investigating the neural underpinnings
several neuroimaging studies revealed a network of areas involved in FB reasoning
in neurotypical individuals. For ASD individuals the neural correlates of false belief
processing are largely unknown. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and an
adapted unexpected transfer task, that makes it possible to distinguish between the
computation of diverging beliefs and the selection of a belief-associated response, we
investigated a group of adult high-functioning individuals with ASD (N = 15) and an
age and IQ matched group of neurotypical adults (NT; N = 15). On the behavioral
level we found no group differences. On the neural level, results were two-fold: In
the story phase, in which participants had to compute whether the character’s belief
is congruent or incongruent to their own belief, there were no differences between
neurotypical participants and those diagnosed with ASD. But, in the subsequent question
phase, participants with ASD showed increased activity in the bilateral anterior prefrontal
cortex, the left posterior frontal cortex, the left superior temporal gyrus, and the left
temporoparietal area. These results suggest that during the story phase in which the
participants processed observable actions the neural correlates do not differ between
adult individuals with ASD and NT individuals. But in the question phase in which
participants had to infer an unobservable mental state results revealed neural differences
between the two groups. Possibly, these subtle neural processing differences may
contribute to the fact that adult ASD individuals are able to master explicit false belief
tasks but fail to apply their strategies during everyday social interaction.
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INTRODUCTION
The ability to attribute mental states such as beliefs, intentions, desires, and emotions to oneself
and other people is necessary to navigate successfully through the social world and is known as
Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalizing. The understanding of false beliefs is commonly considered
to be the critical test for having a ToM. False belief attribution requires a decoupling between a
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person’s mental representation of the world and the real state
of the world and enables a person to understand that mental
states can misrepresent reality. A classical task for testing false
belief understanding is the so-called unexpected transfer task, in
which a character (e.g., Maxi) leaves an object (chocolate) in one
location (e.g., the drawer) and while he or she is outside the
room the object is transferred to a new location (Wimmer and
Perner, 1983). As a consequence Maxi’s subsequent search for
the chocolate in the drawer will be unsuccessfully.
In autism, a central diagnostic criteria is a qualitative
impairment in reciprocal social interaction. A prominent
hypotheses that tried to explain these impairments is the Theory
of Mind deficit hypotheses that is based on the observation
that individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) show
severe deficits in the understanding that in some situations
other people have beliefs and other mental states that differ
from their own (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Senju et al., 2009).
As opposed to young neurotypical (NT) children who begin to
master false belief tasks at the age of four or five, it is not until
the mental age of 6 years that children with ASD pass these
tasks (Happé and Frith, 2014). However, from around 12 years
of age individuals with ASD and average IQ often show levels of
false belief performance that are similar to those of NT children
(Happé, 1995). Nevertheless, it seems that adolescents and adults
with high-functioning autism or Asperger syndrome fail to
employ their knowledge about false beliefs during naturalistic
interactions (Ponnet et al., 2004).
Neuroimaging studies that investigated belief reasoning
gathered evidence that in healthy adults the posterior part
of the medial prefrontal cortex (pMPFC, also referred to as
dorsal MPFC), the bilateral temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), the
posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and the precuneus are
involved in false belief processing (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003;
Saxe and Powell, 2006; Sommer et al., 2007, 2010; Aichhorn et al.,
2009; Scholz et al., 2009; Van Overwalle, 2009; Young et al., 2010;
Rothmayr et al., 2011; van der Meer et al., 2011; Döhnel et al.,
2012, 2016; Schurz et al., 2013; van Veluw and Chance, 2013;
Schuwerk et al., 2014).
There are also some studies that tried to shed light on the
neural underpinnings associated with ToM deficits in individuals
with ASD. These studies used a variety of different tasks that
are supposed to elicit mental state representation resulting in
heterogeneous findings (Happé et al., 1996; Castelli et al., 2002;
Mason et al., 2008; Kana et al., 2009; Lombardo et al., 2011;
Dufour et al., 2013). For example, Kana et al. (2009) investigated
adults with autism and control participants during the viewing of
animated geometrical shapes. In one condition the movements of
the shapes entail the attribution ofmental states like thoughts and
feelings to the figures. On the behavioral level, neither reaction
time nor error rates differed between the two groups. While
results revealed no activity differences in posterior ToM regions,
like the right pSTS, the ASD group showed lower activation in
frontal regions associated with ToM, like the left superior medial
frontal gyrus, the left anterior paracingulate cortex, the bilateral
anterior cingulate cortex and the left inferior orbitofrontal
cortex. Additionally, during the attribution of mental states to
animated figures ASD participants compared to controls showed
reduced functional connectivity between frontal and posterior
(temporal, parietal and occipital) regions and between temporal
and occipital areas. The authors suggested that ASD associated
difficulties in mentalizing may be the result of a decreased
communication and coordination between frontal and other
regions of the brain (Kana et al., 2009).
Using a completely different task–making reflective
mentalizing or physical judgements about oneself or another
person—Lombardo et al. (2011) found that especially the activity
of the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) differentiates
between adult participants with ASD and control subjects.
Behavioral data did not show any group effects, indicating that
ASD individuals responded similar to controls while making
mentalizing and physical judgements. But, while in controls
RTPJ was selectively more responsive to mentalizing than
physical judgements, this selectivity was not apparent in ASD
individuals. Additionally, individuals with ASD who were more
socially impaired had RTPJ responses that were least selective
for mental state information, while those who were least socially
impaired had RTPJ responses that were relatively more selective
for mental state information. Therefore, the authors suggested
that the RTPJ is one of the key areas behind the deficits of ASD
participants in mental state attribution (Lombardo et al., 2011).
The neural systems that specifically underlie the ability
to attribute false beliefs in individuals with ASD were only
investigated by Dufour et al. (2013). They compared adult high-
functioning individuals with ASD with neurotypical individuals
by using verbal stories. In the belief condition the stories
described a character who acquired a false belief. These stories
were compared to a photo condition in which a physical
representation became false, such as an outdated photograph
of a map. Behavioral data were not reported, but the fMRI
results revealed no differences between neurotypical and autistic
individuals, neither in a whole brain analysis nor in a ROI
analysis that focused on typical belief-associated areas. The
authors suggest that in adults the social cognitive impairments
of ASD individuals can occur without differences in activation
patterns during the processing of an explicit ToM task.
In sum, results concerning the neural system that underlies
ToM deficits in ASD individuals are very heterogeneous. Some
authors proposed a lower activity of frontal areas and a decreased
functional connectivity between frontal and other areas in ASD
individuals as key mechanisms for ToM deficits (Mason et al.,
2008; Kana et al., 2009). Other authors emphasized on the role
of the RTPJ in the ToM impairment of ASD individuals (Mason
et al., 2008; Lombardo et al., 2011). And still others found
no activity differences in the brain between ASD and healthy
individuals during processing false beliefs (Dufour et al., 2013).
The aim of the current study was to investigate the
neurocognitive correlates of false belief reasoning in adult ASD
individuals in more detail. In a previous study with healthy adults
Schuwerk et al. (2014) adapted the classical unexpected transfer
task in order to separate two processing phases: the computation
of beliefs and the inference and selection of another’s or one’s own
belief. In neurotypical adults the initial computation phase was
associated with activity in the bilateral temporoparietal cortex,
the posterior MPFC and the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). In
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the subsequent question phase, conditions in which participants
had to consider the other’s belief compared to conditions in
which they had to respond according to their own belief
were associated with activity in the right temporoparietal
cortex. Additionally, the authors show that when incongruent
beliefs had to be computed activity of the pMPFC inhibited
the temporoparietal cortex. These results support suggestions
concerning the role of the pMPFC in stimulus-independent
processing. Stimulus-independent processing is necessary when
the belief of another person becomes false and does not longer
correspond to reality (Sommer et al., 2007; Döhnel et al., 2012),
e.g., a person’s belief that an object is in location A, butmeanwhile
the object has been transferred to location B. It seems that in
these conditions the pMPFC inhibits stimulus-bound processing
which helps to process another person’s false belief decoupled
from one’s own perception of reality.
Interestingly, a recent study of the anatomy of white matter
networks revealed that ASD individuals compared to NT
individuals showed white matter differences in brain areas
associated with belief reasoning. White matter differences in
ASD were localized to major association and commissural tracts
of the frontal lobe (Catani et al., 2016). These tracts connect
frontal lobe to more posterior areas of the parietal, limbic and
temporal lobe. The results are also in line with functional imaging
studies that investigated ToM abilities in individuals with ASD
and pointed to a lower degree of synchronization (functional
underconnectivity) between MPFC and temporoparietal areas
during ToM tasks in adults with ASD compared to neurotypical
adults (Mason et al., 2008; Kana et al., 2009; Murdaugh et al.,
2012). Interestingly, these areas were also associated with the
processing of divergent beliefs in the study by Schuwerk et al.
(2014). Therefore, we suggest that the adapted version of the
false belief task might be a useful tool to reveal possible
differences in the neural correlates associated with false belief
processing between individuals with ASD and neurotypical
adults. Several behavioral studies have shown, that adults with
high-functioning or Asperger autism tend to be just as efficient
in understanding explicit false belief tasks as control subjects
(e.g., Happé, 1995; Scheeren et al., 2013). With respect to these
results we expect no behavioral differences between the two
groups. According to our former fMRI study with NT individuals
(Schuwerk et al., 2014) we hypothesized that in the NT group
the computation of divergent beliefs is related to activity in the
temporoparietal cortex and themedial prefrontal cortex. But with
respect to studies showing underconnectivity between frontal
and temporoparietal areas (e.g., Murdaugh et al., 2012; Catani
et al., 2016), we hypothesized that the ASD group will show
lower activity in the frontal lobe and in the temporoparietal area.
For the question phase we expect higher activity of the right




Fifteen adults with ASD (10 men, mean age = 28.2) and 15
neurotypical (NT) participants (10 men, mean age = 29.87)
with no reported history of psychiatric or neurological disorders
were included in the study. The ASD participants were recruited
through the autism outpatient clinic of the Bezirksklinikum
Regensburg, Germany. All participants were diagnosed by
specialized psychiatrists and psychotherapists according to the
ICD-10 criteria for Asperger syndrome (F84.5, N = 11) and
autism without intellectual disability (F84.0, N = 4) and
were tested with a battery of tests including the Wechsler
Adults Intelligence Scale-revised (WAIS-R), the Adults Asperger
Assessment (AAA, Baron-Cohen et al., 2005; German version
Poustka, 2006), Fragebogen zur Sozialen Kommunikation (FSK;
the German version of the SCQ; Bölte and Poustka, 2006) the
Faux Pas Recognition Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) and the
Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997).
The groups were matched according to gender, age and
IQ measured with the German verbal test Mehrfachwahl-
Wortschatz-Test (MWT; Lehrl, 1989) and the non-verbal
Grundintelligenztest (CFT 20; Weiß, 1998; see Table 1
for details). All of the participants gave written informed
consent prior to their participation and received payment
for participating. The study was approved by the local ethics
committee of the University Medical Center Regensburg.
Task
The present task was a version of the object transfer false belief
paradigm (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), adapted from a prior
fMRI-paradigm (Schuwerk et al., 2014). Each Trial consisted
of two phases (see also Figure 1). In the initial story phase
participants watched a 4 s long animation depicted a room with
a boy flanked by a dark-brown and light-brown box, which
are standing on a wooden floor. Underneath the floor there
was an empty basement. In the beginning of each trial a self-
propelled-moving ball fell in one of the two open boxes. Then
the boxes closed and two events simultaneously happened: the
ball bounced into the basement through a hidden trap door,
what not could be seen by the story character, and the boxes
switched their places, witnessed by the story character. In the
congruent-beliefs condition the ball fell into the basement but
bounced right back into the same box and was transferred inside
the box to the character’s other side. In this condition the story
character and the participant’s belief about the location of the
ball were congruent. In the incongruent-beliefs condition, the
ball fell into the basement, however, bounced back with a short
TABLE 1 | Demographic characteristics.
ASD group (N = 15) NT group (N = 15)
M SD M SD t-value p-value
Age 28.2 10.4 29.9 12.2 0.40 0.69
Verbal IQ
(MWT)
113.5 10.1 112.8 13.9 0.17 0.87
Non-verbal IQ
(CFT 20)
122.3 8.7 125.2 11.0 0.81 0.43
M, means; SD, standard deviation; ASD, autism spectrum disorder; NT, neurotypical.
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental design: Each trial started with the presentation of a video, in which the protagonist compared to the participant either ended up with an
incongruent belief (Top) or a congruent belief (Bottom) about the location of the ball. The story phase was followed by a fixation picture of scrambled pixels with
jittered duration. In the following question phase the participants had to respond either according to their own belief (“Ich?”) or according to the belief of the
protagonist (“Er?”) about the ball’s location. Response was given via button press. The trial ended with a second fixation picture.
time delay and entered the other box after they had switched.
In this condition the story character’s belief and the participant’s
belief are incongruent. The character believes that the ball was
transferred inside the box it initially entered, the participant
knows that the ball was not transferred and is now in the
other box.
After the initial story phase a fixation picture of scrambled
pixels was presented for a varying time interval (jitter) in order
to control for possible overlapping BOLD signal responses to
stimuli (2.3–3.9 s). Then in the following question phase a still
frame was presented for 2.5 s. On this picture the character
was replaced and a written test question was presented. Either
participants were asked in which one of the two boxes the
story character thinks the ball is located (in German: “Er?,”
in English: “He?”) or in which box the participant thinks the
ball is located (in German: “Ich?,” in English: “I?”). Depending
on the prior condition, reasoning about the character’s false
belief (other-incongruent) or true belief (other-congruent) or
reasoning about one’s own belief, either diverging from the
character’s belief (self-incongruent) or corresponding with it
(self-congruent), was required. The task of the participants was
to respond as fast and accurately as possible. Reaction time
(RT) was measured from picture onset until one of two buttons
of a five-button fMRI-compatible response pad (LUNItouch,
Photon Control Inc., Burnaby, Canada) was pressed. Between
trial a fixation picture of scrambled pixels was presented
for 3 s.
The animations were controlled for type, number, order, and
laterality (ball enters the left or right box first) of events. Question
pictures were identical across conditions, showing only the two
closed boxes without any social stimuli. After being given a
standardized instruction and some practice trials outside the
scanner, subjects completed 120 trials, 30 per condition, in a
pseudo-randomized order. Presentation software was used for
stimulus presentation and response recording (Neurobehavioral
Systems Inc., Albany, CA).
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Statistical Analysis of the Behavioral Data
In order to analyze reaction times (RT) and response accuracy
(percentage of correct responses) a repeated measures analysis
(ANOVA) with within-subject factors of perspective (other vs.
self) and congruency of beliefs (incongruent vs. congruent) and
the between-subject factor group (ASD, Control) was performed.
The significance level for the analyses was set at P ≤ 0.05.
Image Acquisition
A 3-Tesla Siemens Allegra Head Scanner (Siemens Inc.,
Erlangen, Germany) located at the University Medical Center
Regensburg was used to record the imaging data. The
scanner acquired echo-planar-imaging (EPI) sequences using fast
gradients. During T2∗ data acquisition, we recorded 32 axial slice
in interleaved order with a Time-to-Repeat (TR) of 2.0 s, a Time-
to-Echo (TE) of 0.95 s, a flip angle of 90◦, a Field of View (FoV)
of 192 x 192mm and a voxel size of 3× 3× 3mm. A total of 767
functional images were recorded in the entire experiment.
A structural image was recorded from every subject at the
end of functional data acquisition. These T1-weighted images
were obtained using a MPRAGE (Magnetization Prepared Rapid
Acquisition Gradient Echo) pulse sequence (TR = 2.25 s, TE =
0.026 s, TI= 0.9 s, FoV= 256mm), scanning 160 slices with voxel
size of 1× 1× 1 mm3.
The entire scan session lasted approximately 35min.
Functional Imaging Data
All images were analyzed with SPM8 (Wellcome Department of
Imaging Neuroscience, London, UL) run in Matlab 7.0 (Math
Works Inc., Nattick, MA).
Individual subjects’ data were slice-timed corrected using
the middle slice as a reference. Images were spatially realigned
to the first volume by rigid body transformation to correct
for head movements. After coregistration to the tructural
T∗1 –weighted images, data were normalized to the functional
template contained in SPM8 (Montreal Neurological Institute
template, MNI) with a voxel size of 2× 2× 2mm3 and smoothed
with a 8mm full-width at half maximum Gaussian kernel.
All statistical analyses were based on functional activity
obtained from the whole brain. In the first level analysis, a
fixed-effects analysis was computed for each participant based
on the general linear model (GLM). The analyses focused on
amplitude changes in the hemodynamic response function (HRF)
associated with the different mentalizing conditions. For each
condition, correctly answered trials were modeled as a boxcar
function convolved with the HRF. In the story phase, the two
regressors for the incongruent-belief and the congruent-belief
condition comprised the last 2 s of the 4 s long video. The events
in the video were timed so that exactly after 2 s it became clear
whether the story character’s belief was congruent or incongruent
to that of the participant. In the question phase, which started
with the onset of the question and lasted for 2.5 s a regressor for
each of the four conditions of interest (other-incongruent, other-
congruent, self-incongruent, self-congruent) was modeled. In
addition to the regressors of interest, the realignment parameters,
the mean constant over scans, and a non-hit parameter (incorrect
responses and misses) were included as regressors of no interest.
The data were high-pass filtered with a frequency cutoff at 128 s.
Statistical parametric maps (SPMs) were generated for each
subject by t-statistics derived from contrasts utilizing the HRF
(Friston et al., 2002). To identify brain activity associated with
the processing of incongruent vs. congruent beliefs in the story
phase, we contrasted the two conditions incongruent-beliefs vs.
congruent beliefs.
In order to detect brain activity associated with divergent
beliefs in the question phase, we analyzed the main effect of
congruency of beliefs [(other-incongruent + self-incongruent)
vs. (other-congruent + self-congruent)]. Additionally, the main
effect considered person was calculated [(other-incongruent
+ other-congruent) vs. (self-incongruent + self-congruent)].
Further we analyzed the interaction effect between the considered
person and congruency of beliefs [(other-incongruent–other-
congruent) > (self-incongruent–self-congruent)] and vice versa.
For group analyses single-subjects’ first-level contrasts were
introduced in second-level random-effect analysis. First, one-
sample t-tests for all contrasts were conducted separately for
ASD and controls. Second, in order to test the influence of
autism we investigated the interaction between group (ASD and
Controls) and condition in the story phase (congruency) as well
as in the question phase (congruency, perspective). Additionally,
we explored whether common brain regions are associated with
processing incongruent beliefs in the story phase and in the
question phase. Separately for the NT and the ASD group,
we computed a conjunction analysis (based on the Minimum
statistic compared to the Null Conjunction; Nichols et al., 2005)
on the contrasts (story phase: incongruent > congruent beliefs)
and [question phase: (self-incongruent + other-incongruent)
> (self-congruent + other-congruent)]. The resulting set of
significant voxel values for each contrast constituted SPM
maps that were thresholded at p < 0.001 (uncorrected, 10 or
more contiguous voxels). Reported significant voxels survived
a statistical FWE (family-wise error)-corrected threshold of
p< 0.001 for multiple comparisons on cluster level. The activated
brain regions were overlaid on the MNI template and labeled




Regarding accuracy, the ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect for congruency of beliefs [F(1, 28) = 11.90, p < 0.01].
Participants gave more correct answers when they were asked
for congruent beliefs (M = 97.44, SD = 3.30) compared to
incongruent beliefs (M = 93.67, SD = 5.61). There was no
influence of group for congruency [congruency × group: F(1, 28)
= 0.09, p = 0.76]. For perspective neither the main effect
[F(1, 28) = 0.09, p = 0.78] nor the interaction perspective ×
group[F(1, 28) = 1.07, p = 0.31] were significant. Also the
interaction congruency × perspective [F(1, 28) = 0.15, p =
0.7] was not significant. Only the interaction congruency ×
perspective × group interaction [F(1, 28) = 4.64, p < 0.05] shows
a significant effect.
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The analysis of RT revealed a similar picture. Only the main
effect congruency [F(1, 28) = 136.74, p < 0.001] was significant.
RT were slower when incongruent beliefs had to be processed
(M = 1366.10ms, SD = 249.96ms), compared to processing
congruent beliefs (M = 977.67ms, SD = 194.49ms). There
were no significant effects for the interaction congruency x
group[F(1, 28) = 0.02, p = 0.89], the main effect perspective
[F(1, 29) = 0.02, p = 0.88], the interaction perspective x group
[F(1, 28) = 1.62, p = 0.21], the interaction congruency x
perspective [F(1, 28) = 0.66, p= 0.42], the interaction congruency
x perspective x group [F(1, 28) = 1.03, p = 0.32]. Altogether
behavioral data show no group differences and no influence of the
considered perspective. For both groups mean RT and response
accuracy for each experimental condition are shown in Table 2.
Brain Imaging Results
Story Phase
In the story phase, for the participants it became clear whether
the character’s belief is congruent or incongruent to their own
belief. However, they did not know whether they have to respond
in respect to their own or the characters’ belief. The analyses of
this phase focused on brain regions engaged in the processing
of emerging incongruent beliefs by contrasting incongruent vs.
congruent beliefs (see Figure 2 and Table 3 for more details).
The full factorial ANOVA design with the two factors
“group” (ASD/NT) and “congruency” (incongruent/congruent)
revealed no significant main effect for “group” or a significant
interaction between “group and congruency.” But there was a
significant main effect “congruency.” Further t-contrasts revealed
that the processing of incongruent compared to congruent
beliefs induced activity in a network of brain areas, including
the posterior medial prefrontal cortex (BA6), the bilateral
posterior/inferior frontal cortex (BA 6/44), the bilateral middle
temporal gyrus (BA 22), the bilateral inferior temporal gyrus (BA
19/7/37) and the left thalamus.
The analyses of the separated groups revealed rather similar
results. In the control group of NT participants the processing
of incongruent beliefs in contrast to congruent beliefs were
associated with activity in the posterior medial prefrontal cortex
(BA 6), the left posterior/inferior frontal gyrus (BA 6/44), the
bilateral middle temporal gyrus (BA 22), the right inferior
temporal gyrus (BA 19/40) and the left thalamus.
TABLE 2 | Mean reaction time and response accuracy.
ASD group NT group
RT (ms) PCR (%) RT (ms) PCR (%)
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Other-incongruent 1410.1 (258.1) 91.6 (7.2) 1308.2 (270.0) 95.3 (6.9)
Other-congruent 1053.1 (189.8) 97.1 (3.5) 911.7 (195.9) 97.8 (3.9)
Self-incongruent 1418.6 (233.0) 94.0 (5.7) 1328.9 (279.2) 93.8 (5.9)
Self-congruent 1007.1 (169.9) 96.7 (3.1) 938.5 (221.1) 98.2 (4.5)
RT, reaction time; PCR, percentage of correct responses; M, means; SD, standard
deviation; ASD, autism spectrum disorder; NT, neurotypical.
In the ASD group incongruent beliefs compared to congruent
beliefs induced more activity in posterior medial prefrontal gyrus
(BA 6), the middle and left posterior/inferior frontal gyrus (BA
6/44), the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44) and the right inferior
temporal gyrus (BA 19/37).
In both groups, for the reverse contrast, congruent-beliefs
condition over incongruent-beliefs condition, no brain area
showed significantly increased activity.
Question Phase
The question phase focused on identifying brain regions related
to processing a response conflict due to diverging mental states.
Results based on the full factorial design with the factors
perspective (self/other), congruency (congruent/incongruent)
and group (ASD/NT) revealed no main effect for perspective,
the interaction perspective x group, the interaction perspective
x congruency or the interaction congruency x group. However,
there was a main effect for congruency associated with
activity in the anterior MPFC/anterior cingulum (BA 10/32).
Further analysis revealed that the activity was induced by
responses to congruent compared to incongruent beliefs and was
independent of group. Results also showed amain effect of group.
The comparison between the two groups revealed that in the NT
group compared to the ASD group the processing of the response
was associated with more activity in the middle occipital gyrus
(BA 19/17/18). ASD individuals showed more activity during the
question phase in several areas, including the bilateral anterior
prefrontal cortex (BA 10/11), the left posterior frontal gyrus (BA
6/8), the thalamus, the left superior temporal gyrus (BA 41/21)
and the left temporoparietal area (BA 39/40; see also Figure 3).
There were no brain regions in which NT compared to ASD
individuals showed significantly increased activity.
We then examined the functional activity within each of
the two groups. In the control group, the comparison between
the other-condition in which the participants had to consider the
other’s belief with the self-condition in which the subjects had
to respond according to their own belief showed no significant
activity. However, independently of perspective, incongruent
compared to congruent beliefs were associated with activity in the
right inferior fontal gyrus (BA 47) and the right inferior temporal
gyrus (BA 19). Congruent beliefs compared to incongruent
beliefs induced more activation in the anterior MPFC (BA
10/11), the bilateral posterior frontal gyrus (BA 8), the right
temporoparietal area (BA40) and the precuneus.
Also in the ASD group there was no influence of perspective
(self, other). But in individuals with ASD the response to
congruent beliefs compared to the response to incongruent
beliefs induced more functional activity in the anterior MPFC
(BA10). There were no significant effect for the reverse contrast
incongruent > congruent beliefs (for more details see Table 3).
Common Activity in the Story and Question Phase
The whole brain conjunction analysis of the contrasts (story
phase: incongruent > congruent beliefs) and [question phase:
(self-incongruent + other-incongruent) > (self-congruent +
other-congruent)] showed only for the ASD group on a lower
cutoff for FEW-corrected results (PFWE-corr = 0.021, cluster
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FIGURE 2 | Story phase: Processing of incongruent beliefs compared to congruent beliefs. Whole brain fMRI findings for the ASD group (in red) and the NT group (in
green). Common activity in both groups is shown in yellow; L, left side; R, right side. Colored regions indicate significantly activated voxels with T > 5.0, PFWE−corr ≤
0.001, cluster level. There were no significant group differences.
level) commonly increased functional activity of the posterior
medial prefrontal cortex (BA 6) associated with the processing
of incongruent beliefs in both the story and the question phase.
For the NT group the conjunction analysis revealed no common
functional activity.
DISCUSSION
Autistic symptoms in adult individuals are highly heterogenous
and vary considerably with many different aspects like clinical
severity, psychiatric impairments, language abilities and
intellectual abilities (Howlin et al., 2004). However, in everyday
situations deficits in understanding other person’s behavior on
the basis of their mental states are present in all individuals with
ASD and represent a significant barrier to social integration
(Howlin et al., 2004; Frith and de Vignemont, 2005). This
observation is in line with experimental behavioral studies
showing that children and adults with high-functioning or
Asperger autism are able to master explicit ToM tasks (Ponnet
et al., 2004; Scheeren et al., 2013), but that they show subtle ToM
impairments in more complex mentalizing tasks (Begeer et al.,
2012; Backer van Ommeren et al., 2015).
Studies that investigated the neural underpinnings of
mentalizing in ASD individuals revealed a rather heterogeneous
picture.Whereas, some results pointed to lower activity of frontal
areas and a decreased functional connectivity between frontal
and other areas (Mason et al., 2008; Kana et al., 2009) or to
decreased activity of the RTPJ during the processing of ToM tasks
(Mason et al., 2008; Lombardo et al., 2011) in ASD individuals,
other studies found no activity differences in the brain between
ASD and healthy individuals during mentalizing (Dufour et al.,
2013). These studies used a variety of tasks that require very
different mentalizing abilities, such as the attribution of mental
states to moving geometrical shapes or making judgements about
another person on the basis of descriptions.
The aim of the present study was to investigate the neural
correlate of a very basic ability necessary for mentalizing,
the false belief understanding, in adults with and without
ASD. We know from several neuroimaging studies that in
neurotypical individuals the posterior MPFC, the bilateral TPJ,
the middle temporal gyrus and the precuneus are involved
in false belief processing (Sommer et al., 2007; Meinhardt
et al., 2011; Rothmayr et al., 2011; Döhnel et al., 2012).
And we know from ToM studies with ASD individuals that
there might be an anatomic and functional underconnectivity
between two brain areas that are centrally involved in false
belief processing, the MPFC and the temporo-parietal junction
(Mason et al., 2008; Kana et al., 2009; Murdaugh et al.,
2012).
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TABLE 3 | Whole brain imaging results for the neurotypical (NT) group, the autism spectrum (ASD) group and the whole group: Significant clusters (PFWE-corr ≤ 0.001,
cluster level) of functional activity: (A) Story phase: peak activation associated with the processing of incongruent beliefs, (B) Question phase: peak activation associated
with the selection of incongruent and congruent beliefs, (C) peak activation associated with group differences during the processing of the question phase, and (D)
conjunction of story and question phase: peak activation commonly associated with the processing of incongruent beliefs.
MNI coordinates
Contrast / Brain region BA x y z Cluster sizea T-valueb
(A) Story phase: incongruent > congruent beliefs
NT GROUP
Posterior medial prefrontal cortex (pMPFC) 6 8 8 66 795 7.60
Left posterior/inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) 6/44 −40 0 42 1,680 14.91
Left middle temporal gyrus (MTG) 22 −64 −32 2 1,069 7.21
Right middle temporal gyrus (MTG) 22 50 −40 14 530 6.18
Right inferior temporal gyrus 19/39 48 −58 −8 12,712 11.59
Left Thalamus −8 −28 −2 316 4.19
ASD GROUP
Posterior medial prefrontal gyrus (pMPFC) 6 −8 6 66 515 4.66
Left posterior/inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) 6/44 −50 −10 42 1000 7.00
Left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) 44 −42 18 24 504 4.44
Right inferior temporal gyrus 19/37 42 −66 −6 7,789 9.78
WHOLE GROUP
Posterior medial prefrontal cortex (pMPFC) 6 −6 6 66 429 10.08
Left posterior/inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) 6/44 −46 −4 44 727 10.03
Right posterior/inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) 6/4 50 −2 34 253 5.45
Left middle temporal gyrus (MTG) 22 −60 −26 0 535 7.79
Right middle temporal gyrus (MTG) 22 52 −38 16 96 6.60
Left inferior temporal gyrus 19/7 −40 −68 8 1,308 10.05
Right inferior temporal gyrus 37/19 46 −60 −8 3,058 11.60
Left Thalamus −8 −28 −2 28 6.47
(B) Question phase: Incongruent (self-incongruent + other incongruent) > congruent (self-congruent + other congruent)
NT GROUP
Right inferior frontal gyrusc (IFG) 47 42 20 −6 208 4.84
Right inferior temporal gyrusd 19 42 −44 2 289 5.53
ASD GROUP
Posterior medial prefrontal gyruse (pMPFC) 6 −4 6 64 238 5.44
Right inferior frontal gyrusf (IFG) 44 32 28 10 258 5.12
Question phase: Congruent (self-congruent + other congruent) > incongruent (self-incongruent + other incongruent)
NT GROUP
Anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) 10/11 14 40 −14 882 6.03
Right posterior frontal gyrus 8 26 24 54 263 6.03
Left posterior frontal gyrus 8 −20 26 54 280 5.67
Right temporoparietal area 40 68 −24 26 416 7.11
Precuneus 31 12 −56 26 526 5.01
ASD GROUP
Anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) 10 −6 54 −10 2109 9.61
(C) Question phase: group differences
NT > ASD
Middle occipital gyrus 19/18 −12 80 18 4,103 9.24
14 −56 −2 7.81
ASD > NT
Left anterior prefrontal gyrus 10/11 −22 52 0 2,119 7.53
Right anterior prefrontal gyrus 10/11 38 48 −12 904 6.94
Left posterior frontal gyrus 6/8 −42 4 60 629 6.89
Left superior temporal gyrus 41/21 −40 −30 8 498 6.23
Left temporoparietal area 39/40 −58 −46 36 612 5.58
(D) Conjunction of story and question phase: (incongruent>congruent beliefs) and [(self-incongruent + other-incongruent) > (self-congruent + other-congruent)]
ASD GROUP
Posterior medial prefrontal cortex (pMPFC)c 6 −4 8 64 295 5.42
Brodmann areas (BAs) are approximate.
aNumber of activated voxels per cluster.
bPeak T-value in activated cluster.
cPFWE−corr = 0.021, cluster-level.
dPFWE−corr = 0.005, cluster-level.
ePFWE−corr = 0.015, cluster-level.
fPFWE−corr = 0.011, cluster-level.
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FIGURE 3 | Response phase: activation maps for the contrast ASD group > NT group. Colored regions indicate significantly activated voxels with T > 5.0,
PFWE−corr ≤ 0.001, cluster level.
In order to investigate, if the possible underconnectivity
between MPFC and temporo-parietal areas might play a role
in false belief processing in individuals with ASD, we used
an adapted version of the classical unexpected transfer task
(Schuwerk et al., 2014) that enables a separation between
the computation of diverging beliefs and the consideration of
another’s or one’s own belief.
As expected, the behavioral results of the present study
revealed no differences between the two groups. The ASD
as well as the NT adults performed very well with over
90% of right answers in all conditions. This result is in line
with former behavioral studies showing that individuals with
high-functioning or Asperger autism are able to compensate
mentalizing deficits in explicit false belief tasks (Happé, 1995;
Scheeren et al., 2013).
Story Phase: Computing Diverging Beliefs
In contrast to our hypothesis, the fMRI results for the story
phase, in which participants had to compute divergent beliefs,
showed no differences in brain activity between neurotypical
participants and those diagnosed with ASD. In both groups the
processing of incongruent beliefs was associated with activity in
the pMPFC, the left inferior frontal gyrus and the right inferior
temporal gyrus. The activation pattern of the whole group is very
similar to that of our previous study (Schuwerk et al., 2014) and
is also in line with findings from earlier studies on false belief
reasoning (Sommer et al., 2007; Rothmayr et al., 2011; van der
Meer et al., 2011; Döhnel et al., 2012; van Veluw and Chance,
2013). In the story phase participants had to compute if reality
(and therefore their own belief) becomes discrepant from the
belief of the story protagonist. The involvement of the pMPFC
especially in this phase of the task indicates that the region plays
a central role in the processing of incongruent beliefs (Schuwerk
et al., 2014). Activity of the bilateral middle temporal gyrus was
also associated with computing another’s discrepant belief. The
region seems to play an important role in the processing of
mental states that can be deduced from perceived actions (for
an overview see Beauchamp, 2015). In the story phase of the
present task it was very important to track the movement of
the ball (did the ball jump back into the boxes before the boxes
switched or did it jump in the other box after the position change
of the boxes?). Based on the ball’s movement, the participants
had to build their own internal mental model. In the incongruent
beliefs condition themovement of the ball led to divergingmental
models (the own belief in contrast to the other’s false belief), in
the congruent condition there were no differences between the
mentalmodel of the participant and thementalmodel of the story
character.
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Question Phase: Considering and
Selecting Own or Another’s Belief
In the question phase, in order to give a correct response
participants had to select the previously encoded own or other’s
belief. Neither for the ASD nor for the NT group an effect of
perspective was found. This result contradicts our previous study
in which Schuwerk et al. (2014) found increased functional brain
activity in the temporoparietal junction for conditions in which
the other’s belief had to be considered in contrast to conditions
in which subjects were asked for their own belief. In contrast,
in the present study we found differences in the functional
activity rather associated with the processing of congruency than
of perspective. These diverging results may be associated with
the necessary adaptations of the used paradigm. Schuwerk et al.
(2014) used another fixation picture (a picture of the two boxes)
and intermixed filler trials with experimental trials in order to
prevent habituation. For ASD individuals the scanning procedure
with the noise and the narrowness of the scanner is very stressing
therefore we reduced the scanning time by skipping the filler
trials.
Also results revealed no significant interaction between group
and congruency. On a more liberal threshold, in both groups
responses to incongruent beliefs compared to congruent beliefs
were associated with activity in the right inferior frontal gyrus.
Activity of the IFC has been observed in many ToM studies
(Mar, 2011) and was primarily found in the response phase
of a task (Samson et al., 2005; Sommer et al., 2007; Aichhorn
et al., 2009; Döhnel et al., 2012). As a basic process, the right
IFG has been observed to be associated with response inhibition
(Aron, 2007; Aron et al., 2014). Consistent with this view, the
IFC is involved in false belief tasks putting high vs. low demands
on self-perspective inhibition (Samson et al., 2005; van der
Meer et al., 2011). During false belief reasoning, in order to
correctly indicate the location where the protagonist will search
for an object, participants have to inhibit their own knowledge
about the object’s location. By contrast, in a true belief task,
the participant’s perspective and the perspective of the story
character are the same. With respect to the current study, it
is argued that the highest demands for response control were
required when participants had to inhibit their self-perspective
on the ball’s location in the incongruent belief condition, in which
their knowledge about the ball’s location did not match with the
knowledge of the story character.
Responses to congruent beliefs compared to responses to
incongruent beliefs induced in both groups increased activity
in the anterior MPFC. This finding is consistent with Döhnel
et al. (2012) and Sommer et al. (2007) who also observed aMPFC
activity for the contrast true over false belief reasoning. The
aMPFC does play an important role in ToM (Carrington and
Bailey, 2009; Frank, 2011). Additionally, the area is also discussed
to be a core region of the brain’s default network, that is centrally
involved in processing self-referential thoughts (Raichle, 2015).
Meta-analysis reported an overlap in aMPFC activity associated
with ToM processing and the default network (Schilbach et al.,
2008; Spreng and Grady, 2009). In our congruent belief condition
participants have to respond according to their own knowledge
about reality, this might have resulted in activity of the aMPFC,
an area which is centrally involved in self-referential thoughts.
CONCLUSION
In contrast to our hypothesis that group differences would
be observable in the story phase, results revealed significant
differences between individuals with ASD and neurotypical
individuals only in the question phase. These activity differences
were independent of perspective or congruency. During the
question phase the ASD group compared to the NT group
showed increased activity in the bilateral anterior prefrontal
gyrus, the left posterior frontal gyrus, the left superior temporal
gyrus and the left temporoparietal area. The anterior prefrontal
gyrus is associated with episodic retrieval and the integration
of diverse information content (Reynolds et al., 2006), a process
generally necessary in contextualizing stimuli and planning
(Koechlin et al., 1999; Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007). And
the superior temporal gyrus as well as the temporo-parietal area
is not only involved in belief based perspective taking during
ToM tasks (Aichhorn et al., 2009; Döhnel et al., 2016), but also
in directing the attentional focus toward behaviorally relevant
objects (Corbetta et al., 2008). Interestingly, the activity increase
in the ASD group is not influenced by the congruency of the
beliefs.
Although the autistic participants executed the belief task
as well as the neurotypical participants fMRI results indicate
that there are differences between autistic and neurotypical
individuals on the neural level. This result contradicts the study
of Dufour et al. (2013) that investigated also belief reasoning
but found no group differences between individuals with ASD
and NT individuals. But in contrast to our study, they did not
differentiate between the computation and question or response
phase. We found differences between ASD and NT individuals
only in the question phase, in which participants had to refer to
a previously encoded observable story line (the movement of the
ball and the boxes) in order to infer an unobservable belief. It
might be that ASD individuals compared to NT individuals have
to recruit a broader network of brain areas in order to respond
adequately to questions concerning beliefs. Additionally, also the
conjunction analysis of common functional activity associated
with the processing of incongruent beliefs in the story and the
question phase may point to subtle differences in the neural
processing between ASD and NT individuals. By using a more
liberal threshold the ASD group showed increased activity in the
pMPFC in both phases during processing incompatible beliefs.
Possibly, these differences in the neural processing play no role
in a belief task executed under scientific, and for the participants’
predictable conditions. But they may have an influence on the
deficits of ASD individuals to infermental states in ongoing social
situations in everyday life.
It is important to note that our sample size was rather small
whichmay reduce the chance to detect neural differences between
ASD andNT individuals during the processing of different beliefs
and may increase the risk that results in neuroimaging studies
are not reproducible. However, the revealed activity of the whole
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group during story processing was very similar to our previous
study (Schuwerk et al., 2014). And also Dufour et al. (2013)
found no differences in brain activation during a false belief task
in adults with and without autism. Additionally, the behavioral
data showed that the ASD group performed equally well on
the unexpected transfer task as the NT group. Therefore, for
future research it could be very interesting to investigate how
individuals with ASD compensate their mentalizing deficits in
such tasks.
SUMMARY
The current study was the first one that used the classic
unexpected transfer task in order to investigate the neural
correlates of false belief reasoning in high-functioning and
Asperger adults. Our adapted version of the task makes it
possible to separate a phase in which diverging beliefs have to be
computed from a phase in which participants have to respond
either due to a diverging belief or to a belief that corresponds
with their own belief and reality. According to former studies we
found no differences between our ASD participants and our NT
participants on a behavioral level. On the neural level both groups
showed similar activation patterns during the processing of the
story, but during the response phase ASD individuals showed
increased activity in fontal and temporoparietal areas. Possibly,
these subtle processing differences may contribute to the fact that
adult ASD individuals are able to master explicit false belief tasks
(Ponnet et al., 2004; Scheeren et al., 2013) but fail to apply their
strategies during naturalistic social interactions.
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